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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit handed down several important decisions in the
area of federal practice and procedure during the survey period. In particular, the court, in a group of en banc opinions, clarified the approach
to be taken when a court is considering imposing pretrial sanctions
against parties and their attorneys. The court also considered when
counsel should be disqualified in cases of successive representation and
determined that the similarity between the factual contexts of the two
representations is the crucial factor. In the troublesome area of in personam jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit held that the traditional "minimum
contacts" test is satisfied when only the effect of an alleged tort takes
place in the forum state. And, finally, the court considered whether documents subpoenaed as evidence by a state grand jury are entitled to protection from discovery in a federal civil proceeding. As a whole, these
decisions perhaps represent the Tenth Circuit's primary contribution to
federal case law during this survey period.
I.

SANCTIONS

In the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided several cases dealing with sanctions imposed on parties or their
attorneys at the pretrial stage. In the case of In Re Baker,' the Tenth
Circuit upheld the imposition of small monetary sanctions, relying on a
broad interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f). Hollis v.
United States, 2 reemphasized the Baker consensus that monetary sanctions
should be imposed whenever unnecessary delays occur and reinforced
the Tenth Circuit's current policy that preventive sanctions may be used
only when extreme circumstances exist. Finally, in D & H Marketers, Inc.
v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc.,3 the Tenth Circuit emphasized its conviction to
sanction those who abuse the pretrial process by holding that a default
judgment imposed as a discovery sanction may not be challenged
through an interlocutory appeal. Considered together, these cases
demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's resolve to breath life into the federal
court's power to impose sanctions to help control court dockets.
A.

Background

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed "to se'4
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
1.
2.
3.
4.

744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
744 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1984).
744 F.2d 1443 (lOth Cir. 1984) (en banc).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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The pretrial process is the primary tool to achieve this goal. 5 In recent
years, however, the civil pretrial process has been used far too often to
postpone resolution of suits and drive up litigation expenses. 6 Thejudicial imposition of sanctions is one method used to curb pretrial abuse
and delay. Although the federal courts have always had the power to
impose sanctions for pretrial abuses, 7 this power has not been fully utilized by trial judges to control their expanding dockets. 8 To encourage
the judiciary's vigorous employment of sanctions to punish recusant
parties who abuse the litigation process, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1983. 9 The amendments sought to remedy the
5. See generally Yankwich, Crystallizationof Issues by Pretrial: A Judge's View, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 470 (1958) (discussing the importance of the pretrial process).

6. Many judges and commentators feel pretrial abuses are so pervasive that they undermine justice in the federal courts. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 446 U.S. 995, 998-1001 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Rosenberg & King, Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579. For more
comprehensive documentation of the problems of pretrial abuse, see generally Levy, Discovery - Use and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17 FORuM 465, 465-73 (1981); Sofaer, Sanctioning
Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 680, 680-83 (1983).
7. The sources of pretrial sanctioning authority include FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to
make or cooperate in discovery) and FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (voluntary and involuntary dismissal of actions). See generally R. Rodes Jr., K. Ripple & C. Mooney, Sanctions Imposable
for Violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Judicial Center (1981) (discussing the federal rules under which sanctions may be imposed). The courts may also
impose sanctions for pretrial abuse under their contempt power. See Ager v. Jane C.
Stromont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980) (The primary beneficiaries of civil contempt are individual litigants, not thejudicial system.); 19 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Courts are
reluctant to administer contempt sanctions since the pervasive judicial attitude is that the
contempt powers are measures of last resort. See Comment, FinancialPenalties Imposed Directly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
855, 861-63 (1979). Counsel may also be liable for excessive costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1982). See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Amer., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1985)
(strictly construing section 1927 and requiring serious and standard disregard for the orderly process ofjustice). Finally, it is well established that courts have the inherent power
to impose a variety of sanctions on both litigants and attorneys to regulate their dockets.
See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (A court has the inherent
power to award costs and attorney's fees against counsel when the court finds the attorney
acted in bad faith.); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (A court has the
inherent power to dismiss a client's case for an attorney's pretrial misconduct.); Betz v.
United States, 753 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1985) (A court has the inherent power to impose a
variety of sanctions on litigants and counsel to regulate dockets and promote judicial efficiency.); see also Comment, supra, at 875-82.
8. See Rosenberg & King, supra note 6, at 494-95 (judges often feel that punishment
for noncompliance with discovery guidelines should be invoked only when a deliberate or
flagrant attitude is demonstrated); Sofaer, supra note 6, at 703-04; Comment, Recent
Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prescriptions to Ease the Pain? 15 TEx. TECH. L.
REV. 887, 898-99 (1984).
9. Of particular note are the amendments to FED. R. Ctv. P. 7, 11, 16, and 26.
"These amendments not only enhance and clarify the duties of attorneys and parties, but
substantially revise and expand the court's control over pending litigation, including the
re-emphasis of the court's inherent power to impose sanctions where necessary." D & H
Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1444 n. 1; see also Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential
Impact of the ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,66JUDICATURE 363, 364
(1983) (tenor of the amendments seek to stimulate judges to use their existing power to
the utmost). See generally Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983) (discussing the
1983 amendments and an analysis of the authority io change the courts' sanction powers);
Long, The New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure- The First Fonr .llonths, 31
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problem of delay and to encourage the use of sanctions to shift the cost
of litigation delay onto the attorneys or parties who abuse the litigation
process.10

B.

In re Baker

In re Baker" is the Tenth Circuit's first in-depth interpretation of
the new sanction sections of the 1983 amendments. In Baker, four days
before a scheduled jury trial, the third party defendant moved the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma for a
continuance based on the failure to depose a critical witness.' 2 At the
hearing on this motion on the first day of trial, the plaintiffs counsel
indicated that he might be partly responsible for opposing counsel's inability to take the deposition in question. After the parties failed to
agree on a time for the deposition, the district court granted the requested continuance. After finding no bad faith, the district court imposed a $175 sanction on both attorneys for the serious inconvenience
13
created for the court and the subsequent burden on the taxpayers.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the imposition of the monetary sanctions
examining the case not only in light of the court's historic sanction powers, but also in light of the 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16.14 Although all pre-1983 sanction provisions may still be
used to control dockets, the focus of the new Rule 16 sanctioning power
is quite different.1 5 The trial courts now have broad discretion to assess
monetary sanctions under Rule 16(). Offenders may be punished not
only when contumacious behavior exists, but also when a trial court's
"high duty to insure the expeditious and sound management of the
preparation of cases for trial" is inhibited. ' 6 No orders need be violated
or bad faith exhibited. Concern over litigation management is sufficient
to place sanctions on those who delay the pretrial process.
Even though the monetary sanctions in Baker were imposed before
the adoption of the 1983 amendments, the Tenth Circuit analyzed this
case under the newly formulated Rule 16 powers stating that "the spirit
FED. B. NEWS &J. 36 (1984) (A survey of cases decided under the amendments and their
significance in fulfilling the amendments' purpose of curtailing abuse.).
10. Marcus, supra note 9, at 364.
11. 744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2016 (1985).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1440. The trial court made no finding of bad faith by either attorney, but
was prompted by concern that "delays caused by negligent counsel burden the taxpayers
and the court system." Id.
14. Rule 16 concerns pretrial conferences, scheduling and management. The 1983
amendments to Rule 16 require the courts to set deadlines for various pretrial matters and
gives the courts power to require litigants' attendance at pretrial and settlement conferences. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(e). Section 16(f) added specific sanctioning authority to the
rule: "In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the
attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (emphasis added). Before this
addition, an abuse of Rule 16 was punishable only under Rule 37 which required a showing of bad faith.
15. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440.
16. Id.
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and purpose of those amendments have always been within the inherent
power of the courts to manage their affairs."' 7 To support their use of
inherent and Rule 16 powers, the Tenth Circuit relied on Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper1 8 where the Supreme Court used its inherent sanction
powers when bad faith existed. The Tenth Circuit justified the use of
inherent power in Baker, where no bad faith was present, by stating that
the Piper case dealt with the sanction of dismissal, making bad faith a
proper requirement.' 9 With the small fine imposed in Baker, however,
the sanction was not as harsh as dismissal; therefore, the new Rule 16
powers could be considered. This reliance on Piper is misguided because Piper actually dealt with the award of costs and attorney's fees, not
the sanction of dismissal. 20 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's logic for dropping
the bad faith requirement for costs and fees loses some of its credibility.
But, despite this misapplication of Piper, the Tenth Circuit's use of the
court's inherent power to sanction was justified; inherent power to sanction has traditionally been viewed as broad enough to cover pretrial
21
abuses without a showing of bad faith.
In reviewing the district court's imposition of sanctions for abuse of
discretion, 22 the Tenth Circuit stated that the totality of circumstances
should be considered. 2 3 Because these sanctions were imposed for interference with court management of the case, the Tenth Circuit heavily
emphasized congestion of court calendars as a factor. 24 The attorney's
failure to depose a witness constituted a pattern of negligence which
disrupted the trial court's schedule. The Tenth Circuit observed that
the sanctions were imposed to manage the district court dockets and
avoid unnecessary burdens on the courts, not to deal with the refusal to
comply with court orders. The primary purpose for the monetary sanctions was to insure reasonable management requirements for case preparation. The secondary purpose was to compensate opposing parties
for their inconvenience and expenses caused by the unwarranted delays. 2 5 Consequently, as a message to the lawyers involved, and the bar
generally, the $175 sanction imposed on each lawyer was not an abuse
17. Id. at 1441.
18. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
19. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.
20.

Compare Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-68 with Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.

21. Callip v. Harris Country Child Welfare Dept., 757 F.2d 1513, 1518-19 (5th Cir.
1985) ("[Tlhe 1983 amendments were not intended to alter ... the district court's inherent power to dismiss or impose lesser sanctions for violations of court orders and rules
and for dilatory conduct in general."); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561
(3rd Cir. 1985).
22. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam) (sanctions under Rule 37 are reviewable under the abuse of discretion
standard).
23. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440. In addition, the court enumerated the following factors
which should be considered in the totality of circumstances: the specific case under review; the total management problems for courts; and, access and cost problems for
litigants.
24. d. The court noted that the expense and delay problems have been well documented and that Rule 16 was amended to alleviate these pretrial management problems.
25. Baker, 744 F.2d at 1441.
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of discretion considering the broad parameters of Rule 16(f). 26 In fact,
the Tenth Circuit stated that it is the district court's duty to impose sanctions upon anyone, attorneys or parties, who causes unnecessary
27
delays.
The Tenth Circuit clearly encouraged trial judges to use Rule 16.
Appropriate monetary sanctions should be imposed under Rule 16 on
any attorney acting negilgently or causing court delays. Although
neither a contumacious attitude nor consistent failure to obey court orders is essential for sanctions under Rule 16, the Tenth Circuit warned
that justification for such sanctions must be set forth in the trial court
28
record.
C.

Hollis v. United States

In Hollis v. United States, 2 9 the Tenth Circuit restated its position on
the type of misconduct warranting harsh preclusive sanctions. The issue
presented in Hollis was whether the dismissal of an action was too severe
a sanction for a party's failure to file an amended complaint when there
was no serious inconvenience to the opposing party and where the suit
had been pending for a comparatively short time. In this case, the district court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within
thirty days. When this thirty-day period had expired, without any communication from the plaintiff's counsel, the district court dismissed the
plaintiff's original complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to
file an amended complaint as ordered by the court. 30 The plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the Tenth Circuit held that dismissal under
those circumstances was too severe a sanction and constituted an abuse
3 1
of the district court's discretion.
In analyzing the sanction, the Tenth Circuit stated that dismissal is a
drastic measure 32 to be ordered only when a party intentionally or repeatedly fails to adhere to ongoing court orders and when the opposing
party is prejudiced or seriously inconvenienced. When these circumstances do not exist the interests of justice are better served by action
26. Id. The Tenth Circuit declined to determine whose "reasonable expenses" were
recoverable under Rule 16(f) in the Baker case. Since the statutory language did not limit
recovery solely to an opposing party's expenses, the court did say the awareness of court
costs should not be irrelevant. Id. at 1441-42.
27. "If the fault lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of sanction should be
lodged. If the fault lies with the clients, that is where the impact of the sanction should be

lodged." Id. at 1442.
28. Id. The need for such justification led to the case's only dissent. Circuit Judge
McWilliams felt that the trial court record was too sketchy to warrant the sanctions imposed. Id. at 1442. Subsequent decisions have shown that the court of appeals will insist
on justification in the trial court record before sanctions under Rule 16 will be imposed.
See In re Russel, 746 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir. 1984); Hollis v. United States, 744 F.2d 1430
(10th Cir. 1984); Sterling Energy, Ltd. v. Friendly Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir.
1984).
29. 744 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1431-32.
31. Id. at 1433.
32. Id. at 1432 (citing Davis v. Operation Amigo, Inc., 378 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1967)).
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against the offending attorney. 33 The Tenth Circuit stated that the attorney's actions in Hollis did not warrant dismissal but are of the type
that warrant sanctions, like those imposed in Baker. However, any delays
more severe than the ones in Hollis would warrant a dismissal. The case
was reversed and remanded and the Tenth Circuit encouraged the district court to consider substantial monetary sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel.3 4 This decision reinforced the Tenth Circuit's new
resolve to punish parties or attorneys for pretrial abuses with monetary
sanctions but emphasized that preclusive sanctions may be imposed only
when more severe misconduct exists.
D.

D & H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc.

Although not dealing directly with sanctions, the Tenth Circuit did
decide the important issue of when sanction orders are appealable in D
& H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc. 35 This case considered
whether appellate jurisdiction exists to review sanction orders having a
substantially preclusive effect on the claims of one party but not terminating the entire action. The Tenth Circuit held that such sanction orders are not appealable since the orders in question were neither a final
judgment 3 6 nor collateral orders, which constitute an exception to the
final judgment rule. 3 7 This decision significantly narrowed the Tenth
Circuit's previous view that monetary and preclusive sanctions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) were directly reviewable even
when all claims have not been adjudicated. 3 8 Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit stated that district court sanctions would have the greatest impact if appellate review of sanctions is not possible until final adjudica39
tion on the merits.
D & H Marketers, filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, involved multiple parties in a complicated proceeding alleging federal securities violations and common law
33. Hollis, 744 F.2d at 1433 (citingJackson v. Washington Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
34. Hollis, 744 F.2d at 1433.
35. 744 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
36. The appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals is limited by the concept of finality. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 states in part that "[tlhe courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." For cases interpreting the finality rule, see Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); B.F. Goodrich Co. v.Grand
River Dam Authority, 712 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983); see also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (1976) (discussion of the purpose of

the final judgment rule).
37. D & H Alorketers, 744 F.2d at 1446 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1940) (The collateral order exception, or Cohen exception, to the finality rule
was judicially created by giving 28 U.S.C. § 1291 a practical rather than technical construction, balancing judicial efficiency and justice.)).
38. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1372 (10th Cir.) (preclusionarv
and monetary sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) for noncompliance with a discovery order are immediately appealable under the Coh-n exception), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978).
39. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1446.
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fraud. Eight defendants were initially sanctioned for failure to comply
with discovery orders. 40 When these defendants continued to improperly respond to the plaintiffs discovery requests, the judge sanctioned
the defendants by entering a default judgment against them pursuant to
Rule 37(b)(2). 4 1 The default judgment was not a final adjudication because it did not adjudicate all the claims of the parties. Furthermore, the
trial court did not utilize Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to authorize an immediate appeal. 42 The eight defendants filed a notice of
43
appeal from the default judgment orders.
The Tenth Circuit prefaced its analysis by acknowledging the
widening judicial concern about the district court's effective management of burgeoning dockets, increased use of sanctions to control pretrial abuses, and the respect accorded these attempts by parties and
attorneys. 44 The Tenth Circuit considered the above factors to determine whether a trial court's sanctioning effort is best supported by allowing interlocutory review.
The Tenth Circuit examined the relevant law pertaining to appellate review. The district court's sanction orders were not appealable as
final judgments, 4 5 necessitating the consideration of whether they were
reviewable under the exception to the general finality rule enunciated in
Cohen v. Benenficial Industrial Loan Corp.4 6 This exception to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, the finality rule, 4 7 requires the existence of three elements before
one claim may be reviewed prior to the total adjudication of all case
claims: -[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
40. Id. at 1444.
41. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
If a party. . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. . . the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(c) An order . . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party ....
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states in pertinent part: "[Tihe court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry ofjudgment." See generallv Note, Federal Civil Procedure- Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
- A Proposed Two-Part Analysis for the Exercise of a TrialJudge's Discretionary Certification of a
Claim as Final Under Rule 54(b) When a Counterclaim Remains Pending, 25 VILL. L. REV., 179
(1979-80) (a review of 54(b) policies and the application of the rule).
43. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1444.
44. Id. at 1441 n.1. Referring to the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court noted the heightened duties of attorneys and parties to help the
court control litigation.
45. Only an entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) would be a final default
order. See supra note 42.
46. 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (whether security need be posted in a shareholder's derivative action is appealable without awaiting final judgment).
47. Id. at 546. The Court in Cohen determined that if an issue is separate from and
collateral to the rest of the claims asserted in the action, an interlocutory appeal is allowed
when the claim is too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Id. See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (1976) (general discussion of collateral order exception).
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the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."'4 8 In D & H Marketers, the Tenth Circuit found the first two factors of the Cohen exception: (1) the eight defendants were effectively
terminated from the case by the trial court order; and, (2) the orders
appealed from conclusively resolved an issue separate from the merits of
the action. However, the Tenth Circuit failed to find the third element
49
because the orders were reviewable on appeal from final judgment.
Thus, the default judgment orders were not immediately reviewable on
appeal since the Cohen collateral order exception was inapplicable.
The Tenth Circuit observed that strict adherence to the finality rule
would enhance the trial courts' broad discretionary power in managing
their dockets, including the imposition of sanctions. "Attorneys and
parties will be fully aware that they must bear the burden of sanctions to
the conclusion of the case and appeal on the merits of the fully adjudicated case with no more hope of reversing the sanction order on appeal
than normally attends an appeal asserting abuse of a broad trial court
50
discretion."
The decision in D & H Marketers brings the Tenth Circuit in line
with the intent of the Cohen exception and the other circuits which have
considered the issue. Prior to D & H Marketers, the Tenth Circuit had
found that preclusive and monetary sanctions fall within the Cohen exception. In Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co. ,51 the Tenth Circuit permitted
direct appeal of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions before the final adjudication on
the merits. The Anderson court failed, however, to explain why it was
allowing direct appeal of sanctions; therefore, other circuits have been
reluctant to follow the Tenth Circuit's example. 5 2 The court in D & H
Marketers specifically distinguished Arthur Andersen, narrowing the holding to its facts. 5 3 D & H Marketers is more in accord with the intent of
the Cohen decision and is an effective way of insuring that sanction orders will be taken seriously.
E.

Conclusion

Considered together, Baker, Hollis, and D & H Marketers demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's resolve to help district court judges manage
their dockets in an expeditious manner and also encouragejudges to use
48. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1445 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
49. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1445-46.
50. Id. at 1446.
51. 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Coleman v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 746 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1984);
Mulay Plastics, Inc. v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 742 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1409 (1985); Eastern Maico Distributors, Inc. v. MaicoFahrzeugfabrik, 658 F.2d 944,947 (3d Cir. 1981);Johnny Pflocks, Inc. v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 634 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. D & H Marketers, 744 F.2d at 1446. In Arthur Andersen, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with an order which, if complied with, could have put the complaining party in
violation of foreign law. Therefore, immediate appeal was necessary since effective appeal
would posssibly have been denied later. Id.
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the sanction powers available to them to insist that parties and attorneys
fulfill their duties. The effect of these decisions remains to be seen. Despite the Tenth Circuit's attempt to give trial judges an effective weapon
to combat pretrial abuse, many of the factors which cause delay are still
outside the trial court's reach. Small monetary sanctions are no more
than a nuisance compared to the advantages which can be derived from
tactical delays. Although the Tenth Circuit sent a clear message to trial
court judges concerning the imposition of sanctions for pretrial abuses,
it is ultimately up to the trial judges to impose these sanctions consistently. Their actions will determine if these Tenth Circuit decisions will
help to curb pretrial dilatory behavior.
II.

DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL: SMITH V

WHATCOTT

During the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit clarified the analytical process to be used when considering disqualification of counsel
for conflicts of interest in cases of successive representation. 54 In Smith
v. Whatcott, 55 the Tenth Circuit vicariously disqualified an entire law firm
from representing defendants due to one attorney's prior representation of the plaintiff in a related criminal action. 5 6 The one attorney's
knowledge of the prior criminal action was imputed to the entire firm,
even though no information was actually disclosed or access to the attorney's files permitted. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether vicarious firm disqualification may be avoided by setting up
an internal screening procedure, a "Chinese wall," which would prevent
the flow of information from an attorney with potentially. confidential
information regarding an adverse party, to other members of his law
firm.
The first lawsuit Leon Smith was involved in was filed by Provo City,
Utah, against him for violations of apartment house zoning ordinances. 5 7 Mark Anderson, a Boyden Kennedy & Romney (Boyden) attorney, handled Smith's case and negotiated a settlement with the city.
After the settlement, Smith consulted Anderson about filing a civil action against the former owners of the apartment house. Smith decided
to hire other counsel and terminated Anderson's employment in 1980.58
The second suit involving Smith was filed by Smith in early 1984
against the former apartment owners for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation of occupancy limits during the sale of the building to Smith.
54. In disqualification cases, successive representation exists when an attorney accepts
employment in a suit against aformer client while concurrent representation occurs when
employment is accepted in a suit against an existing client. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to
Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 680-81 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Chinese Wall Defense].

55. 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985).
56. Vicarious disqualification is "[t]he principle that a lawyer can be disqualified from
representing a client in a matter adverse to the interests of a present or former client of
one of his present or former partners or associates." Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 996, 1000 (1979).
57. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1099.
58. Id.
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In this action, Smith was awarded $210,000 in damages. The defendants retained the law firm of Nielsen & Senior to appeal this adverse
judgment to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Shortly before Nielsen
& Senior was retained, however, most of the Boyden attorneys, including Anderson, joined the Nielsen & Senior firm. 59 Clark Neilsen discovered Anderson's former representation of Smith, and the resulting
potential conflict, when reviewing the Smith criminal trial transcript.
60
Smith's present attorney was not notified of the potential conflict.
Later, Smith recognized Anderson's name on the Nielsen & Senior letterhead and informed his attorney of the conflict. Smith's attorney contacted Nielsen & Senior about the situation but no solution was
negotiated and briefs were filed as scheduled. Smith then filed a motion
to disqualify Nielsen & Senior as defendants' counsel. 6 1 After a full evidentiary hearing, 6 2 the Tenth Circuit granted the motion and struck the
Nielsen & Senior brief and docketing statement from the appellate
record.
In ruling on the motion to disqualify Nielsen & Senior, the Tenth
Circuit first determined that the motion was diligently filed and should
be heard. The defendants had argued that the motion should not be
considered since it was made after briefs were filed. 6 3 Responding to
this contention, the Tenth Circuit recognized that motions to disqualify
counsel must be diligently pursued to avoid waiver and may not be filed
merely as a litigation tactic. 6 4 The Tenth Circuit, however, did not find
59. Id. The precaution taken against conflicts of interest between these firms was a
comparison of current client lists, not former client lists. Anderson was unaware that Nielsen & Senior had been retained to represent the defendants on appeal.
60. Id. Work on the appellate brief continued and all files were kept in Arthur and
Clark Nielsen's offices. Anderson never discussed his representation of Smith with anyone
at his new firm and no one was allowed access to the previous lawsuit files.
61. Conflict of interest cases are generally decided under the ethical rules of the particular jurisdiction in order to protect the interests of clients, the public and the integrity
of the bar. Greene, Everybody's Doing It - But Who Should Be? Vhen to Make a Disqualification
Motion Based on an Attorney's Representation of a Client with Interests Adverse to those of a Former
Client, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 205, 206 (1983); see also Trane v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994,
999 (9th Cir. 1980) (the disqualification rule is necessary to implement many of the canons
of professional ethics). Rule 1(g) of the Rules of Practice of the Utah federal district court
incorporates both the state and national codes of professional responsibility. E.E.O.C. v.
Gygi Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 620, 621 n.l (10th Cir. 1984).
Because attorney disqualification cases involve the disclosure of confidential information normally prohibited from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, Canons 4 and 5
are used to protect the interests of clients, while Canon 9 is often referred to as the means
of protecting the public's interests and the integrity of the bar. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY Canons 4, 5, and 9 (1986). Generally, Canon 4 is applicable in the

successive representation context while Canon 5 applies more often to concurrent representation cases. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 54, at 68 1.
62. See Fullmer v. Harper, 517 F.2d 20, 21-22 (10th Cir. 1975) (a written response, a
full evidentiary hearing, and specific conclusions recorded on a reviewable record required
on motions to disqualify counsel).
63. Vhatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100.
64. See Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejection of motion
to disqualify counsel filed on the eve of trial, based on information known long before the
filing); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bolding, 447 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1971)
(right to object to own attorney's conflict of interest waived where client knew of conflict
and allowed attorney to conduct the trial).
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any such unacceptable behavior on the part of Smith's attorney; Smith's
attorney immediately notified Nielsen & Senior after the conflict was discovered and pursued a solution. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit criticized Nielsen & Senior for not thoroughly inquiring about the Boyden
firm's past clients and chastened Clark Nielsen specifically for not deal65
ing with the problem before the briefs were filed.

The Tenth Circuit next focused on the merits of the motion to disqualify counsel, clarifying the analytical process to be used in cases of
alleged attorney-client conflicts created by successive representation. A
66
two-step analysis is to be employed in vicarious disqualification cases.
First, the court must examine if the attorney who previously represented
the moving party should be disqualified from working for the moving
party's opponent because of a conflict of interest. To disqualify an attorney for conflict of interest, a "substantial relationship [should] exist
between the pending suit and the matter in which the challenged attorney previously represented the client.''67 Whalcott is the first Tenth Circuit case specifically stating what criteria should be considered in finding
a "substantial relationship."'6 8 "Substantiality is present if the factual
contexts of the two representations are similar or related."'6 9 The Ninth
Circuit uses the same standard and will disqualify an attorney for even
70
the slightest hint of impropriety.
Applying these standards to the facts of Whalcolt, the court found a
65. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100.
66. Id. at 1100-01. The court structured its opinion in two-step form. This is also the
form of inquiry which is used in other circuits. See, e.g., Note, Rebuttable Presumptions In
Vicarious Disqualification Cases: Can The Appearance of Impropriety Be Rebutted? - Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
1077, 1079 (1980).
67. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100. This test was originally enunciated in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), and adopted by the
Tenth Circuit in Redd v. Shell Oil, 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975).
68. Other circuits differ on how to determine if a substantial relationship exists between an attorney's present case and the interests of a former client. The opinions range,
even within circuits, from requiring disqualification on even the appearance of impropriety
to demanding clearer proof of an actual conflict. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake,
703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (A judge determines: (1)the scope of the representation; (2)
whether it is reasonable to infer that confidential information from the former client would
be given to a lawyer representing the present client; and (3) whether this information is
relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the former client.); General
Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1979) (the Sixth Circuit does not
consider the issues of the two cases but requires that a substantial relationship exist between matters.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980); Government of India v. Cook Indus.. Inc..
569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) (the issues involved in the two representations must be
"identical or essentially the same."). See generally Riger, Disqualifying Counsel in Corporate
Representation - Eroding Standards in Changing Times, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 995, 998-99
(1980).
69. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100 (citing Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85,
87 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980)). This
broad interpretation of "substantial relationship" emphasizes avoiding even the smallest
possibility of impropriety even when there is only the slight probability that confidences
were or will be disclosed.
70. Trone, 621 F.2d at 998; see also Comment, Disqualificationof Counsel: Adverse Interests
and Revolving Doors, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 199, 207-09 (1981) (criticizing Trones unusually
expansive reading of the "substantial relationship" test).
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substantial relationship between the alleged misrepresentations at the
time of the sale (the civil fraud suit) and the resulting action brought for
zoning ordinance violations (the criminal suit). The Tenth Circuit concluded that Anderson did have a conflict of interest and was prohibited
from participation in the appeal. Since the factual situation in the
Whatcott case presented a clear cut instance of a conflict of interest resulting from successive representation, it is difficult to determine if the
Tenth Circuit is actually showing a preference for the Ninth Circuit's
concept of the substantial relationship analysis or if it was simply a convenient phrase to cite. If the Tenth Circuit is showing a preference for
this approach then attorneys will be disqualified for even the slightest
hint of impropriety. If the Tenth Circuit is not showing a preference for
the Ninth Circuit standard, a more substantial nexus should be shown
between the present litigation, in which the attorney is representing an
opponent in prior litigation, and the party represented in the prior
litigation.
After finding a substantial relationship between the two successive
cases, the Tenth Circuit presumed that confidential information was actually given by the client in the first case to the attorney. 7' The Tenth
Circuit, discounting a previous Tenth Circuit decision, 72 aligned itself
with the majority of other circuits by holding that this presumption is
irrebuttable. 73 Making the presumption irrebuttable protects former
clients from having to reveal confidential information in order to prove
that the attorney whose disqualification is sought actually received confi74
dential information.
In the second step of the analysis, the Tenth Circuit examined if
Anderson's disqualification disqualified his entire firm. In resolving that
question, the Tenth Circuit recognized a second presumption; that the
attorney possessing confidential information shares this information
with his partners thereby requiring the vicarious disqualification of the
71. The Trone court indicated that this rule of disqualification perhaps serves to preserve the secrets and confidences communicated by clients. If there is even a reasonable
probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used by an attorney in adverse
representation, a substantial relationship is presumed. "Both the fact and appearance of
total professional commitment are endangered by adverse representation in related
cases." Trone, 621 F.2d at 998-99.
72. Waters v. Western Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971) (citing Cord
v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964)). Previously in the Tenth Circuit, when there
was a change of professional employment during litigation giving rise to an apparent conflict of interest, the trial judge was not required to go into the question of whether there
was an actual conveyance of privileged information from the former client. The trial judge
was, however, allowed to ignore the appearance of impropriety if there were actual facts
present to show that no conflict of interest existed.
73. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Containers Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1341, 1347 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Gibbs v. Paluk, 742
F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1984); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980);
Arkansas v. Dean Food Products Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled on other
grounds, In re Multipiece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. Id.
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entire firm. 75 However, the Tenth Circuit did not state if this presumption is irrebuttable. The defendants urged the Tenth Circuit to allow a
limited exception to firmwide disqualification where a particular firm can
prove that the firm attorney with the conflict of interest has been effectively excluded by a "Chinese wall" from participation in the second
case. 7 6 After discussing this exception and the factors which must exist
to prove that specific institutional mechanisms exist to block the flow of
confidential information, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether
to adopt the exception. 77 The Whatcott case was considered an inappropriate vehicle for this decision since no such effective prior screening
procedures were used by Nielsen & Senior.
Judicial resolution of attorney disqualification cases involves the
balancing of several competing policy interests; the integrity of the legal
system and the protection of client confidences versus the availability of
legal services and the right of a client to choose counsel. Although
Whatcott has helped define and clarify how the Tenth Circuit will analyze
motions to disqualify attorneys and firms for conflicts of interest, it is
unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit refused to specifically state how the
"substantial relationship" test will be applied, or rule on the Chinese
wall exception to the imputed knowledge presumption. The result
leaves law firms in the circuit in a quandry, not knowing if the screening
procedures described in this case will benefit them or simply be a waste
of firm funds. Law firms must continue to face the choice: should they
accept a client who has a potential conflict of interest with one firm attorney and set up a "Chinese wall" system, or should they flatly turn
clients away who would subject them to vicarious disqualification?
III.

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

Before a court may adjudicate an action seeking to impose duties or
obligations upon a defendant, it must obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. 78 In the current survey period, the Tenth Circuit, in the case of
Burt v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,79 determined the reach
of Colorado's long arm statute, haling an out-of-state defendant into a
Colorado federal district court when only the "effect" of the alleged tort
took place in Colorado. This variation from the traditional "minimum
contacts" standard is one more interpretation of the Supreme Court's
75. Id. at 1101.
76. Id. A "Chinese Wall" is an internal screening procedure set up by a lawfirm to
isolate an attorney with a conflict of interest from the rest of the firm so that any confidential information is not transmitted to other firm attorneys. Several circuits allow the existence of such procedures to rebut the presumption that an attorney possessing confidential
information shares this information with his partners. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 714
F.2d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791,
793-94 (Ct. CI. 1977). Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101-02; Note, The Chinese Wall Defense, supra

note 54.
77. Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101-02.
78.

R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

1.01(2) (1983).

79. 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 521 (1985).
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multiple applications of the due process clause. 8 0 To assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident a court must: first, exercise the state's
long-arm statute allowing for substituted service of process; and second,
analyze whether the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to employ this long-arm jurisdiction without
violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 ' The
Supreme Court's most recent decisions in this area refine the character
of contacts a nonresident must have with a forum state to allow the exer82
cise of long-arm jurisdiction without violating the due process clause.
In Burt, the Tenth Circuit determined the reach of Colorado's long-arm
statue 8 3 by using the due process guidelines set forth in the Supreme
84
Court mass media defamation cases of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
85
and Calder v. Jones.
In Burt, the Tenth Circuit examined whether one allegedly defamatory letter mailed from Nebraska to Colorado conferred personal jurisdiction upon the Colorado Federal District Court over a nonresident
defendant.8 6 The plaintiff, Dr. Burt, was a medical doctor who completed an orthopedic residency under Dr. Connolly at the University of
Nebraska. 8 7 After the residency, Dr. Burt applied for but was denied
staff privileges at several Colorado hospitals because of a "very unfavorable" letter sent by Dr. Connolly.8 8 Burt filed suit against Dr. Connolly
and the University of Nebraska Board of Regents seeking damages for
80. See Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudence of PersonalJurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 699, 699 (1983) ("Few fields of
legal thought have been as plagued by a penchant for abstraction as has personal jurisdiction."). Several commentators have divided the Supreme Court decisions along two distinct lines: those which follow "minimum contacts" analysis and consider all of the factors
which go into such a determination; and those which follow a single factor or "satellite
basis" analysis and consider factors outside the traditional minimum contacts standards.
The cases in the latter category tend to focus on one theme such as the "fairness" of
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant. See Lewis, A Brave New Wforld for PersonalJurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984); McDougal, Judicial
Jurisdiction:From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982).
81. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64 (4th ed. 1983). See also Note, PersonalJurisdictionOver Publishers in Defamation Actions: A Current Assessment, 30 VILL. L. REV. 193, 197 (1985).
82. C. WRIGHT, supra note 81, at § 64.
83. In diversity cases, the rules governing a federal district court's jurisdiction are
equivalent to the rules governing state court jurisdiction in the state where the federal
district court is located. R. CASAD, supra note 78, at 5.02(3). Many long-arm statutes are
intended to extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the federal due process
clause. Therefore, these statutes are construed to be coextensive with the due process
clause and a court need only determine if the United States Constitution has been violated.
Since Colorado is one such state, see Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 744 F.2d 731,
733 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1879 (1985), the court need only examine the constitutional issue, not the statutory one, to determine ifjurisdiction exists. Burt, 757 F.2d at
243.
84. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
85. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). For a discussion of the guidelines set forth in Keeton and
Calder, see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
86. Burt, 757 F.2d at 243.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 246. The allegedly defamatory letter was a required response to the hospitals' inquiries regarding Dr. Burt's orthopedic residency and general medical competence.
In fact, Dr. Connolly had a duty to reply to the hospitals' solicitations.
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defamation and numerous other causes of action. The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, stating that the Board of Regents was immune from prosecution under the eleventh amendment
and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Connolly. Burt appealed the jurisdictional issue. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case stating that the Keeton and Calder cases,
decided after the district court ruling, required reversal. 89
In Keeton and Calder, the Supreme Court set forth the proper due
process analysis for exercising long-arm jurisdiction over mass media
defendants in a defamation action. 90 Both Supreme Court cases involved libel actions against publishers or employees of large magazines
with nationwide circulations. The defendants had no contact with the
forum states other than the circulation of their magazines. 9 1 The Court
upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction in both cases on the ground
that publishers must anticipate defending suits in states where regular
monthly sales occur. 9 2 The Tenth Circuit found these cases dispositive
of the jurisdictional issue in Burt.
The Tenth Circuit in Burt was divided on the interpretation of Keeton and Calder. The majority, consisting of Circuit Judge Seymour and
District Court Judge Anderson, sitting by designation, found the commercial mass media case analysis applicable, even though the alleged
defamation resulted from a single letter. Relying on the emphasis
placed in Calder on the intentional nature of the defendant's conduct and
the calculated injurious effect in the forum state, the majority pointed
out that an individual injured in one state need not go to another state
93
to seek redress and that this was not a case of untargeted negligence.
If Burt's allegation was true, "no due process notions of fairness are
violated by requiring one who intentionally libels another to answer for
the truth of his statements in any state where the libel causes harm to the
victim." ' 9 4 The Tenth Circuit majority emphasized that the state has a

strong interest in exercising jurisdiction over those who commit torts
within its boundaries; therefore, it was "fair" to hale Dr. Connolly into
89. Id. at 244.
90. For an in-depth analysis of the Calder and Keeton cases, see Levine, PreliminaryProcedural Protectionfor the Press from Jurisdiction in Distant Forums after Calder and Keeton, 1984
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 459; Note, Constitutional Law - Consistency in the Due Process Requirement?, 18
CREIGHTON L. REV. 125 (1985); Note, PersonalJurisdiction Over Publishers in Defamation Actions: A Current Assessment. 30 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1985); Comment, Minimum Contacts and the
First Amendment: When Should They Meet?, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 467 (1983) (written prior to the
Supreme Court decisions).
91. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772; Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85.
92. Both cases also rejected the theory of some federal circuits that a greater showing
of contacts is necessary for media defendants in defamation actions because of first
amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780-8 1; Calder,
465 U.S. at 790-91. This aspect of the Supreme Court cases is irrelevant in the cases'
application to Burt, especially since this media exception was rejected by the Tenth Circuit
in Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 325 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
911 (1977). See also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij,
N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983).
93. Burt, 757 F.2d at 244.
94. Id. at 245.
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Colorado federal district court. 9 5 The majority paid lip service to the
traditional minimum contacts standards, but focused on the effect of the
tortious action in the forum state. 9 6
In the dissent, however, Circuit Judge Seth outlined a different application of the Calder effects test.9 7 He stated that Calder contains "a
mixture of the minimum contacts facts, minimum contact cases, and the
'effects' theory." 98 Consequently, Judge Seth believed that the court
should apply the "effects" test within the context of the minimum contacts doctrine. This more confined view of what contacts are necessary
to fulfill due process requirements requires a closer relationship between the defendant's conduct and the forum state. Judge Seth stated
that the Calder effects test requires that both the "focal point of the story
and the harm" be within the forum state. 99 According to Judge Seth,
the focal point of the story in Burt was the residency program in Nebraska, not the alleged injury in Colorado.
Finally, the dissent noted that the circumstaces of this case were far
removed from the environment found in the Supreme Court mass media
cases. Publishers of nationwide magazines must reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in many states because of the impact of their
magazines' circulation. Individuals such as Dr. Connolly do not have
these expectations and the impact of their alleged libel must still be analyzed within the context of their minimum contacts with the forum
state.100
Despite the persuasive dissent, the Burt case demonstrates that the
Tenth Circuit will find personal jurisdiction over an alleged libellist
whenever the effect of the allegedly tortious conduct is directed into the
forum state, regardless of whether the defendant is a part of the commercial mass media or if the defendant is an individual. According to
the Tenth Circuit, both types of defendants have a reasonable expectation of being haled into court in the forum state even with no other
contacts with the forum state than the effect of their allegedly tortious
conduct.
IV.

CIVIL DISCOVERY

OF

STATE

GRAND JURY DOCUMENTS

In two separate opinions, the Tenth Circuit determined whether
documents subpoenaed as evidence by a state grand jury are materials
that are entitled to protection from discovery in a federal civil proceeding. The case of United States ex rel. Woodward v. Tynan 101 was before the
Tenth Circuit twice to determine this issue. Although some guidance
was given concerning Rule 6(e)'s relationship to subpoenaed docu95. Id. at 244.
96. Id. at 243-45.
97. Id. at 245-47 (Seth, J.,
dissenting).
98. Id. at 245.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 246.
101. 757 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1985) (Tynan I), decided on other grounds, 776 F.2d 250
(10th Cir. 1985) (rehearing en banc) (Tynan II).
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ments, the Tynan decisions still left some confusion over what procedure
should be used by a federal court when a party wants grand jury information released from another court.
A.

Tynan I

In Tynan I, a civil suit was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado by the Colorado Attorney General against
Tynan and seven corporate entities involved in the operation of nursing
homes in Colorado. The complaint alleged that defendants had filed
fraudulent claims with the Colorado Medicaid program. 10 2 Access to
the ordinary business records of the corporate defendants was essential
to the state's case. These records 'had already been seized from the defendants and were the basis for a criminal prosecution in a Colorado
state court.' 0 3 In the criminal proceeding, use of the records was suppressed and the judge ordered the records sealed because the search
warrant used to obtain the-records.was improperly based on grand jury
testimony.' 0 4 In the federal district court action, the Attorney General
was unsuccessful in obtaining an order from the state court freeing the
records and subsequently filed a motion in the federal district court to
compel the defendants to consent to the documents' release. This motion was denied. Because the state could not proceed with the federal
case without the records, the suit was eventually dismissed with prejudice. The state appealed the denial of the motion to compel and the
order of dismissal.' 0 5 The Tenth Circuit, Judge Logan writing for the
panel majority, reversed the order of dismissal and instructed the federal district court to order the state court to release the records.
The secrecy of grand jury proceedings, codified in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), is not absolute. 10 6 Where, as in Tynan I,
information is sought from a grand jury for a civil proceeding, Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) allows disclosure "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with ajudicial proceeding."' 0 7 Anyone needing
disclosure of testimony transcripts under this clause must demonstrate a
102. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1086.
103. People v. Tynan, 701 P.2d80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
104. Id. Such records would normally be discoverable in a civil case under FED. R. Civ.
P. 34.
105. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1086-87.
106. FED. R. CRAM. P. 6(e)(2) states:
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. - A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 106-09 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1985).
See generally Note, Lifting the Bridled Veil: Disclosure of GrandJupy Proceedings Under Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 459 (1980) (discussing standards under which documents and trial transcripts may be disclosed in criminal and civil
cases) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lifting the Bridled Veil].
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
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"particularized need" for the materials. 108 Unfortunately, the courts do
not agree on the application of Rule 6(e), and the "particularized need"
standard, to documents subpoenaed by a grand jury as evidence. 10 9 If
the documents are sought only for their intrinsic value and not to discover what happened at the grand jury proceeding, some courts do not
subject such documents to the strict "particularized need" standard.
Documents requested under those circumstances do not fall within the
scope of "matters occuring before the grand jury.""I1 0 Other courts,
however, refuse to make a distinction between documents and transcripts of testimony insofar as Rule 6(e) is concerned."'
In Tynan I, the Tenth Circuit first decided whether documents kept
in the ordinary course of business are privileged grand jury material
under Rule 6(e). The Tenth Circuit sided with those circuits which hold
that documents sought for their intrinsic value do not disclose "matters
occurring before the grand jury." Relying on the Second Circuit's reasoning enunciated in United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc.," l2 that
data sought in furtherance of a lawful investigation rather than to learn
what took place before a grand jury has no valid disclosure defense, the
1 13
Tenth Circuit stated that the records should be made available.
The Tenth Circuit then pointed out that even if the documents were
entitled to secrecy, the proper procedure for determining if they were
exempt under Rule 6(e) was not followed. Using what a Supreme Court
case, Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 1 14 described as the "better
practice" for making this decision, the Tenth Circuit stated that the following three part procedure should be followed. First, application to
the state court holding the documents should be made; second, the state
court should make a written evaluation of the need for continued secrecy using the limited evidence it has of the federal civil case; third, the
108. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Dennis v. United
States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962). The standard for "particular need" requires that
[p]arties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy,
and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
109. See M. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
36:121 (2d ed. 1985); Note, Civil Discove, of Documents Held by a GrandJuy, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 604 (1980) (an analysis of the current law on the secrecy of documents subpoenaed

by a grand jury); Note, Lifting the
Bridled Veil,
supra note 106, at 480-83 (discussion of a twopronged test for disclosure of documents).
110. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.) (federal and local employment
records are documents outside the scope of Rule 6(e)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960) (trucking company's financial accounts and business records not subject to Rule 6(e) secrecy rule); see
also In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla.

1977); Capital Indem. Corp. v.First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 930-31 (D. Mass.
1975); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 245 F.2d 667 (7th

Cir. 1957).
11I.See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962).
112. 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960).
113. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1087-88.
114. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. 211.
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state court should send the material to the federal district court where
the civil case is pending. The federal district court, with its special
knowledge of the civil action before it and the conclusions of the state
court having control over the grand jury, should make the final
determination. 115
The Tenth Circuit then stated that the same result was required
even though the records at issue were in the custody of a state court.' 16
Even assuming that Colorado law requires nondisclosure of these documents, the Tenth Circuit majority felt that federal law should determine
the discolsure issue. Relying on a Seventh Circuit case, Socialist Workers
Party v. Grubisic,' 17 the court stated that comity requires that disclosure
should first be sought through the state court. If disclosure is not permitted, however, the federal district court should order the state court
to transmit the materials for an in camera examination according to Douglas Oil and Rule 6(e) principles.' 18 Since the federal district court judge
in Tynan I did not follow this procedure, the judge did not exercise informed discretion and the case was remanded.' 19
Circuit Judge McWilliams, in a strong dissent, opposed the Tynan I
majority's recommended procedure for resolving the disclosure issue
and declared it to be an "unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary
into a state court proceeding."' 2 0 Judge McWilliams believed that the
abuse of discretion standard was improperly applied, 121 that Douglas Oil
did not mandate the procedures outlined by the majority, 12 2 and that a
state court protective order is entitled to the respect of the federal
courts. 123

B.

Tynan II

To avoid the potential supremacy clause and full faith and credit
clause problems created by Tynan I, the Tenth Circuit, in a rehearing en
banc, handed down Tynan H. This case redefined the procedure for releasing the records, requiring the defendants to request the documents
from the state court so that they could abide with the federal court's
discovery order. 12 4 The revised procedure avoided ordering the state
court to relinquish the documents to the federal court in the hope that
the documents could now be released by the state court under Colorado
115. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1088.
116. Id.
117. 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1089-90.
119. Id. at 1091.
120. Tynan 1, 757 F.2d at 1093 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
121. Circuit Judge McWilliams stated that the federal district court's refusal to grant
the motion to comply was not "arbitrary and capricious" since the records were subject to
a protective order by a court and not in the defendant's custody or control. Id. at 1091-92.
122. According to Judge McWilliams, the Douglas Oil "better procedure" need not be
used in this case since the state judge had adequate knowledge of the federal civil case to
make an intelligent decision on whether disclosure was proper. Id. at 1092-93.
123. Id. at 1093.
124. United States ex rel.
Woodard v. Tvnan (Tvnan //), 776 F.2d 250, 251-52 (1985).
The Tynan I decision was neither reaffirmed nor disavowed in Tvnan II. Id. at 251.
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law. The Tenth Circuit ordered that the discovery request be channeled
through the original owners of the records.' 2 5 The Tenth Circuit supported this procedure by noting that "documents produced for a grand
jury remain the property of the person producing them."' 12 6 Normally,
these documents are returned to their owners upon completion of the
grand jury's task.' 27 The court further held that ordering the defendants to request the release of the record was within the federal court's
power, analogizing the situation to federal court requests for records in
28
possession of a third party.'
If the Colorado court agrees with this new procedure, the constitutional issue created in Tynan I will be avoided. Regardless of the Colorado court's eventual action, the Tynan cases provide insight into the
procedure used to maintain grand jury secrecy when documents are
sought for a civil proceeding in another court. After the Tynan cases, the
correct procedure to obtain documents from another court is to have
the owner of the evidence channel the request to the court with custody
of the document.
May Oldfather

125. For a commentary lavoring this method of obtaining discovery, see Comment,
Civil Discovery of Doomiens feld br. a GrandJupy. 47 U. Cni. L. RE%-. 604. 613-20 (1980).
126. Tyrian II, 776 F.2d at 252 (citing Granberv %.District Court, 187 Colo. 316, 32223. 531 P.2d 390. 394 (1975)).
127. Tyian I1, 776 F.2d at 252 (citing in re Doe. 537 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (D.R.I. 1982));
see also In re Bendix Aviation Corp.. 58 F. Supp. 953. 954 (S.1).N.Y. 1945).
128. Tyrian I1. 776 F.2d at 252 (citing Powell %.Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D.
431, 433 (N.D. Ga. 1978): Karlsson v. Wollson, 18 F.R.D. 474, 476-77 (1). Minn. 1956);
and Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. -. Rain, 91 F. Supp. 778, 781-82 (E.D.S.C. 1950)).

